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PREFACE 
There have been a large number of changes in Government 
Policies and regulations surrounding the agricultural financial markets 
in recent years. For this reason Messrs Pryde and Bain have updated 
their monitoring of the finance sector a short time following their two 
1984 reports (Discussion Papers 82 and 86). 
The Agricultural Economics Research Unit will continue in this 
and other areas, to monitor adjustments to policy and their impacts on 
the Agricultural Sector. 
(v) 
R G Lattimore 
DIRECTOR 
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The following discussion of the agricultural credit market 
encompasses agriculture in its wider sense. Because most of the 
available information and data on agricultural credit is concerned with 
traditional forms of pastoral farming (sheep, beef and dairy) the 
discussion relates primarily to those sectors. However, the growing 
importance of other sectors such as horticulture, grain cropping and 
deer farming is recognised and where possible their credit situation is 
also considered. 
The purpose of the paper is to update previous research by the 
Agricultural Economics Research Unit into the financing of the 
agriculture industry. (1) 
In 
relatively 
agriculture 
support from 
steady flow 
cornerstones 
But 
Budget of 
expenditure 
sold within 
the past the agricultural credit situation has been 
stable. Because of its large contribution to exports, 
(pastoral agriculture in particular) received considerable 
Government in the form of policies aimed at maintaining a 
of investment. Credit assistance was one of the 
of these policies. 
in 1982 the Government began to change its stance. In the 
that year interest payments and certain development 
ceased to be tax-deductible where the farm property was 
10 years of purchase. 
Although this steadied inflation in land prices, long term 
investors particularly pastoral farm investors still enjoyed 
considerable advantages over investors wishing to borrow capital for 
diversification into or expansion of enterprises which were capable of 
better returns on investment. It was not until late 1984 that a wide 
range of policies were introduced to remove these advantages and 
promote greater equity between enterprises and industries requiring 
capital for restructuring or expansion. As a result some of the 
conclusions reached in Discussion Papers on agricultural and 
horticultural credit published by the Unit as recently as April and 
October 1984 (1) have been quickly overtaken by economic events and 
need updating. 
(1) Pryde, J.G. and Bain, L.B. (1984), The State of Agricultural 
Credit in New Zealand. A.E.R.U. Discussion Paper No. 82, 
Lincoln College. 
Pryde, J.G. and Bain, L.B. (1984), Financing New Zealand 
Horticulture. A.E.R.U. Discussion Paper No. 86, Lincoln 
College. 
J. 
2. 
This paper begins with a background of trends in the New 
Zealand economy and then in chronological order details recent changes 
in Government Policy. This is followed by a discussion of the 
implications of these changes for the financing of agriculture. 
Finally the present state of the agricultural credit market is 
discussed and some conclusions are drawn. 
The discussion is based on a variety of sources including MAF, 
Reserve Bank, Treasury, AERU and private economic reports and data. A 
considerable part of the material was also obtained from personal 
correspondence and interviews with people directly involved in the 
finance industry. The views expressed are, of course those of the 
authors. 
SECTION 2 
RECENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY AFFECTING THE FINANCING 
OF THE FARMING SECTOR 
2.1 Background 
Until the mid 1960's New Zealander's enjoyed a high standard of 
living relative to other OECD countries based on a profitable trade in 
agricultural commodities. The efficiency of the agricultural industry 
and the healthy market for its products led to agriculture supplying 
over 90 per cent of New Zealand's foreign exchange earnings. 
This relatively high standard of living based on agricultural 
exports allowed New Zealand governments to increase their role in the 
economy. to finance higher levels of expenditure and to pursue a policy 
of full employment. An increased share of resources, both government 
and private were channelled into development of protected local 
industries and services. 
But during the 1960's New Zealand's position began to change. 
Agricultural commodity prices started what was to be a long-term 
decline in real terms. This was partly because of increasing 
protectionism in developed countries but also because of factors such 
as changes in consumer tastes and more abundant supplies of 
agricultural commodities generally from around the world. The main 
symptoms of this decline have been poor terms of trade, a rapidly if 
belatedly devaluing New Zealand dollar and a lowering of living 
standards relative to other OECD countries. 
It is only in recent years, however, that the decline has been 
recognised as a long-term one. In the meantime New Zealand pursued 
policies of Government deficit financing and industry protection based 
on the assumption that relatively high living standards would be 
restored through a return to higher agricultural commodity prices. As 
this failed to eventuate New Zealand's relative standard of living 
declined to the point where it became one of the lowest among O.E.C.D. 
countries. 
Since the decline in the New Zealand economy has been 
recognised as more than a short term downturn some effort has been made 
by the Government to remedy the situation. The result has been the 
removal of some of the anomalies that encouraged inefficient uses of 
resources and their replacement by increased competition. 
Agriculture has been required 
adjustments with tax concessions, SMP's, 
and direct subsidies all being removed or 
a two year period. 
to make almost immediate 
low cost Rural Bank finance 
substantially reduced within 
Two factors have often been cited as the reasons for 
agriculture requiring heavy subsidies. These are an over-valued 
exchange rate and the denial of access to inputs at world market 
prices. While devaluation and the subsequent floating of the New 
Zealand dollar have resolved the former problem the latter is still 
very much in evidence. 
3 . 
4. 
Although devaluation gave local industry a substantial lift in 
protection, import licence availability is generally to be increased by 
only 10 per cent of the local market in 1984/85 and 5 per cent each 
year thereafter. This long phase-in period, added taxes in the form of 
import licence tender premiums and no definite timetable for a 
reduction in global import tariffs will probably result in little, if 
any, relative fall in the cost of manufactured inputs to agriculture. 
The labour market is unlikely to be exposed to competition. The 
proposed Goods and Services Tax may have an adverse effect because 
farming has a low direct tax contribution but a high level of purchases 
of goods and services. In these circumstances agriculture may bear the 
brunt of the restructuring of the New Zealand economy. 
2.2 The "Claw-back" Tax Provisions 
The 1982 Budget was perhaps the first to acknowledge the 
distortions that were being caused by selective assistance to 
agriculture. New tax provisions introduced by this Budget were aimed 
at combating high rates of inflation in land prices. Although other 
factors such as low cost lending to agriculture, input subsidies and 
guaranteed returns through SMP's undoubtedly contributed to the high 
rate of land inflation, tax concessions which allowed taxable income to 
be turned into tax-free capital gains were singled out as major 
contributors. 
Legislation was introduced which provided for the recovery of 
tax deductions previously allowed for interest and farm development 
expenditure where land was sold within 10 years of purchase. The 
legislation also limited the amount of farming losses which could be 
offset against profits in other businesses to $10,000. These losses 
were often the result of high interest and development expenditures 
which were then recovered as a tax-free capital gain on the sale of the 
property. 
The effect of the legislation was to restrain the demand for 
land. Tax-free capital gains could still be made on short-term 
investment but were usually offset by the loss of previous tax savings. 
2.3 Reserve Bank Lending to Producer Boards 
Currently seven producer boards hold accounts with the Reserve 
Bank. Of the seven, the Wool Board has no overdraft facility and three 
have a small overdraft facility (Milk Board, Poultry Board, and Tobacco 
Board). The largest borrowers are the Dairy Board with a $750 million 
loan, the Meat Producers Board with a $439 million overdraft and $496 
million loan (30 September 1984) and the Apple and Pear Board with a 
$34 million overdraft (30 September 1984). 
The trend has been for these facilities to be restricted or 
reduced and the Boards encouraged to borrow from commercial sources. 
Examples are the removal of the Wool Board's overdraft facility in 
1983, the phasing out of the Tobacco Board's facility between 1983 and 
1988; and the removal of the Dairy Board's overdraft facility which 
had exceeded $1,200 million, and its replacement (1 September 1985) 
with a sub-ordinated loan of $750 million. 
The term of the Dairy Board's loan is for a period of 40 years, 
commencing as from 31 May 1986 at an interest rate of 1 percent. With 
the granting of the loan the Dairy Board was required to find the 
5. 
balance of its funding requirements for stock and debtors from trading 
banks at commercial rates. 
An exception to the above trend has been the Meat Board's 
accounts. From 1983 to 1984 the Reserve Bank overdraft increased from 
$286 million to $439 million. Then on 30 September 1984 the Government 
approved the placement of the accumulated deficits in the Sheepmeat and 
Beef Income Stabilisation Accounts ($496 million) into sub-ordinated 
loan accounts with the Reserve Bank. The term is for 30 years, 
interest free for the first 5 years then at the rate of 1 per cent. 
The bulk of Reserve Bank lending to Producer Board's has been 
at the rate of one per cent - to help compensate for export and import 
substitution incentives given to other sectors. The reductions have 
therefore had a large impact not only on the availability of funds to 
agriculture but also on the costs of servicing those funds. 
Notwithstanding this the amended arrangements still amount to a 
substantial subsidy. 
2.4 Removal of SMP's 
The Supplementary Ninimum Prices scheme was introduced in 1978 
- a supplement to the existing industry stabilisation schemes. With 
the failure of meat and wool prices to reach the predicted levels 
payments under the scheme (see Table 1) became a major subsidy to the 
sheep and beef sector. 
The SNP payments further increased an already excessive Budget 
deficit and attracted threats of greater trade restraints in some 
markets. Under this pressure the Government announced in June 1984 
that the SNP scheme for dairy, sheep and beef producers would be 
abolished after the 1~83/84 season. To help sheep farmers adjust lump 
sum payments equal to anticipated SMP payments were made to the Meat 
and Wool Boards for the 1984/85 season. 
TABLE 1 
Pa:rments to Farmers Under 
Supplementary Minimum Prices Scheme (Sm) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985E 
WOOL 0.0 0.0 184.2 176.7 78.8 0.6 
/'1EAT- Lamb 0.0 0.0 93.9 146.5 213 .2 72 .0 
Mutton 0.0 0.0 8.7 11.6 48.4 38.0 
Beef 0.0 1.9 53.3 17.6 0.0 0.0 
DAIRY 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
E Agricultural Review Committee estimate of lump sum payments. 
SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
6. 
2.5 Devaluation 
In the face of a run on foreign exchange holdings, on 18 July 
1984 Government announced a 20 per cent devaluation of the New Zealand 
dollar. The New Zealand dollar had been overvalued for most of the 
previous 20 years while the currency was managed under fixed and 
floating peg systems. 
The effect of this overvaluation was to transfer income from 
exporters (principally farmers) who received less $NZ for the (say) SUS 
their product earned: Government, industries and consumers were able 
to buy more for their New Zealand dollar when paying for foreign 
finance, goods and services. While this helped restrain price 
increases in the short term, in the longer term the rate of inflation 
continued to increase. 
Failure to contain inflation has contributed to a considerable 
decline in the value of the New Zealand dollar over the past 20 years. 
The movement in the exchange rate index, which is based on the average 
value of the New Zealand dollar in relation to a basket of currencies, 
is shown in Figure 1. 
The index in Figure 1 does not reveal the change in value of 
the $NZ against individual currencies and in particular does not show 
the substantial decline in relation to the strong currencies of 
economies such as those of the USA, West Germany and Japan. This is 
shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Fall in the Value of the New Zealand Dollar 
from March 1965 to March 1985 
======================================================================= 
Exchange Rates as at Fall 
As Against: 29.3.65 29.3.85 (%) 
U.S. Dollar 1.378 0.4510 67 
Japanese Yen 500 115.79 77 
West German D.M. 5.51 1.4604 74 
Australian Dollar 1.24 0.6488 48 
U.K. Sterling 0.505 0.3848 24 
SOURCE: Reserve Bank 
The past overvaluation of the New Zealand Dollar affected 
adversely the financing of agriculture. With the consequent reduction 
in farm incomes farmers were placed at a disadvantage in competing for 
finance on the open market. The result was the development of a wide 
range of Government regulations and subsidies to help agriculture 
compete. 
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NOTE: The exchange rate index is a measure of the average 
value of the New Zealand dollar in relation to a basket of 
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2.6 Decontrol of Interest Rates 
In the year leading up to the devaluation in July 1984 a series 
of new Government regulations had been introduced to try and reduce 
interest rates comprehensively in line with the falling rate of 
inflation which had been brought about by the wage and price freeze. 
Existing regulations controlled only a limited number of financial 
institutions such as savings banks, trading banks and stock and station 
agents. 
As a result loan funds tended to dry up. The reduced amount 
available went only to enterprises having the least risk interest 
rates could not be increased for higher risk enterprises. This 
inhibited the development of new enterprises as these tend to have a 
greater risk factor. 
With the announcement of devaluation in July 1984 these recent 
controls on interest rates were lifted. This allowed most 
institutional and individual lenders to set their own interest rates 
both for loans and deposits. Long standing regulations which prevented 
trading banks paying interest on deposits of less than 30 days and 
which limited the rate on ordinary savings accounts to 3 per cent were 
abolished six weeks later. 
2.7 Termination of the Wage and Price Freezes 
In an effort to reduce the rate of inflation Government 
regulations were introduced in June 1982 which imposed a wage and price 
freeze. This freeze with extensions continued until November 1984. 
The benefit of the freeze to farmers was reflected in the greatly 
reduced rate of increase in farm costs (T~ble 3). 
Year ended 1 Jan 
All Groups Prices 
TABLE 3 
Sheep and beef Farm Input Prices 
- annual percentage change 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
23.0 17.1 10.1 0.3 
E Agricultural Review Committee Estimate 
SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
1985E 
11.0 
Since the termination of the freeze new wage fixing rules have 
been announced and a tight monetary policy is being pursued to restrain 
inflationary pressures. Despite these measures the rate of inflation 
has nearly doubled from a rate of 2.2 per cent for the June 1984 
quarter to 4.3 per cent for the March 1985 quarter. Private sector 
firms recovering their margins following the end of the price freeze 
were a significant factor but higher costs for imports following 
devaluation and new methods of setting Government charges for goods and 
services must also be contributing factors. 
9. 
2.8 Reductions in Input Subsidies 
In 1982 the first moves towards reducing input subsidies began 
with reductions in fertiliser and weed control subsidies. However, the 
major reductions were not announced until the 1984 Budget. 
This package included the removal of fertiliser transport 
subsidies from Budget night and the fertiliser price subsidy from 31 
March 1986. The cost of product inspection services provided by MAF 
was put on a cost recovery basis - one third recovery in the 1985/86 
season and two thirds recovery in the 1986/87 season. Also subsidies 
on irrigation schemes were halved and those on water supply schemes 
were reduced from 50 to 35 per cent. The agricultural investment 
allowance and payments under the Noxious Plants Control Scheme expired 
in March and February 1985 respectively. 
2.9 Rural Bank Interest Rates 
In addition to the reduction in input subsidies the 1984 Budget 
announced reductions in interest rate subsidies on Rural Bank lending. 
These had increased steadily since 1974 as Rural Bank interest rates 
were allowed to fall behind commercial interest rates. The gap and 
therefore subsidy was increased in 1983 when Rural Bank interest rates 
were reduced by the Minister of Finance as part of measures to press 
private sector lenders to reduce interest rates. 
The 1984 Budget - measures which also applied to Lands and 
Survey Department and Maori Affairs Department farm loans - provided 
for interest rates to be increased in steps up to a market "indicator" 
rate of 15 per cent. For those loans which were at rates of less than 
9.5 per cent the adjustment will take six years to complete. 
2.10 Removal of Foreign Exchange Controls 
On 21 December 1984 following a substantial increase in foreign 
exchange dealer licences (now 15) during 1984, the introduction of a 
more realistic exchange rate and market determined interest rates, 
foreign exchange controls were abolished. These controls had been in 
force in one form or another since 1938 and were finally acknowledged 
to be generally ineffective. 
2.11 Removal of Reserve Asset Requirements 
On 7 February 1985 regulations which had required private 
financial institutions to hold specified proportions of their capital 
in Government and Local Body securities were abolished. Although 
introduced to give security to investors they had become increasingly a 
tool of monetary policy. Excess liquidity was absorbed by increasing 
the reserve asset requirement, thus curbing the ability of institutions 
to lend. The deposits also came to be used as a source of low-cost 
public debt. The removal of the controls became possible with the move 
to higher interest rates on public debt and the use of open market 
sales to control liquidity. 
2.12 Floating of the New Zealand Dollar 
The most recent step in reducing controls affecting financial 
institutions was the change from a fixed to a floating exchange rate on 
4 March 1985. As discussed earlier the fixed and floating peg exchange 
rate systems frequently overvalued the $NZ to the farmers' 
disadvantage. The new exchange rate system should be a fairer means of 
remunerating those farmers who sell their products on overseas markets. 

SECTION 3 
IMPLICATIONS OF THESE CHANGES FOR THE 
FINANCING OF AGRICULTURE 
3.1 Servicing Ability 
3.1.1 Incomes 
The impact of recent changes in Government policy varies with 
the sector of agriculture being considered. Generally incomes have 
improved since devaluation as prices for inputs remained frozen for 
three months while prices for agricultural products showed almost 
i~uediate improvements. 
But now the adverse effects of devaluation and the ending of 
the price freeze, interest rate decontrol and the removal of subsidies 
are beginning to be reflected in current farm incomes and particularly 
in farm budget projections. 
In the horticulture sector there are wide variations. 
Nectarine and apple growers have had a particularly good year and 
kiwifruit returns have picked up since the 1983 downturn. But crops 
such as squash, onions and potatoes have shown very poor returns. 
Grape growers have also experienced falling returns as wine 
consumption has failed to keep up with the increase in production. 
This problem has been compounded by a lift in the tax on wine by 
approximately $1 per litre and increased imports from Australia under 
the CER agreement. 
Overall the pastoral sector appears to have experienced a 
significant improvement in incomes during the 1984/85 season. Factory 
supply dairy farm incomes may be an exception. Assuming little change 
in the prices paid to farmers and a normal 1984-85 season, net incomes 
are estimated to decline by 8.4 per cent on incomes received in 1983/84 
which was a particularly good production season. 
By contrast 1984/85 sheep and beef farm incomes are expected to 
increase by 44 per cent over the 1983/84 financial year. This is a 
result of a combination of particularly poor returns in 1983/84, a good 
production season in 1984/85 and the improvement in prices following 
devaluation. 
This improvement in incomes will undoubtedly help sheep and 
beef farmers to cope with the increases in the cost of finance which 
occurred in 1984. There has been such an improvement that farmers are 
repaying some of the seasonal debt which was incurred to maintain 
working capital during the poor 1982/1983 and 1983/1984 seasons. This 
is reflected in the subtantial fall in the amount of seasonal borrowing 
from Stock and Station Agents and Trading Banks. 
However, this improvement in most pastoral incomes in the 
1984/85 season creates a false impression. The benefits of devaluation 
and the good season will soon be more than offset as the average 
interest rate increases as loans come up for review or renewal. The 
negative impact of devaluation in the form of rising input costs and 
the effect of removing subsidies will combine to depress farm incomes 
II. 
12. 
even further. 
percent (MWBES 
year. 
In total these changes are estimated to result in an 18 
1985) fall in farm incomes during the 1985/86 financial 
Farmers' outlook for agricultural prices which usually tends to 
be optimistic showed some pessimism in the results from a recent survey 
of farmer opinion (Pryde and McCartin, 1985). These results are shown 
in Table 9. When combined with declining incomes this uncertainty 
about the future is tending to discourage farmers from further 
borrowing. But there are of course always those who spend all their 
cash income and expect to borrow their way out if there is a downturn. 
In this coming downturn they are likely to find that they cannot afford 
to borrow more. By contrast the efficient farmers are conserving their 
cash through income equalisation deposits, repaying short-term debt or 
building up cash deposits with financial institutions in readiness for 
the 1985/86 financial year. 
3.1.2 Cost of Finance 
The cost of finance to farmers is very variable. On average 
the cheapest sources have been Local Bodies and the most expensive have 
been Finance companies. Overall the average interest rate paid by 
farmers has been relatively low (Table 4) as those sources contributing 
the most finance to agriculture have had the lower interest rates. 
TABLE 4 
Interest Rates Paid by Farmers 
(as at June 1984) 
======================================================================= 
Source Minimum Maximum Mean 
Rural Bank 3 19.5 8.8 
Other Govt. 5 24.0 9.8 
Trustee Banks 7 22.0 14.6 
Trading Banks 4 22.0 14.7 
Building Societies 11 19.0 15.2 
Insurance Companies 7 23.5 14.2 
Stock & Station Agents 5 21.0 15.3 
Trust Companies 8 20.0 15.2 
Solicitors Trust Funds 9 20.0 16.5 
Family Loans 0 24.0 9.9 
Vendor Finance 0 25.0 12.7 
Local Body 3 15.0 8.3 
Finance Companies 0 25.0 17.9 
Dairy Companies 3 18.0 l3.8 
Private Savings Banks 14 19.0 16.5 
Other Sources 0 22.0 12.9 
Overall 0 25.0 U.8 
======================================================================= 
SOURCE: Derived from unpublished data from the Lincoln College "New 
Zealand Farmer Intentions and Opinions SurveYj 1984". 
Following the 
devaluation in July 
quickly to rates on a 
introduced (Table 5). 
removal of controls on interest rates with the 
1984 interest rates on new lending increased 
par with those charged before the controls were 
TABLE 5 
New Mortgage Interest Rates 
- Private Sector Sources 
======================================================================= 
1983 1984 
Month May May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec E 
Av.Rate 17.27 12.86 12.93 12.76 13.08 13.91 15.01 16.01 17.00 
% 
======================================================================= 
E Estimate SOURCE: Reserve Bank Bulletin 
Interest rates on existing loans have been slower to impact on 
farm incomes. Up until the time of the removal of controls interest 
rates were still being reduced at loan reviews. It was often the case 
that these lower rates came into effect after the removal of controls 
and could not be increased again until the next review. Even with the 
modern trend to short review periods of less than one year it is 
unlikely that the average rate of interest on existing loans will 
return to pre-control levels until the 1985/86 financial year. Thus it 
will not be until the end of the 1985/86 year that the full impact of 
removing the controls will be seen in farmers' financial records and 
the national statistics based on them. 
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One steadying influence on the rising cost of finance to 
farmers has been the move to small stepped increases in Rural Bank 
interest rates. The effect of this policy has been considerable as 
Rural Bank loans account for more than one third of all farm debt 
(Table 11). Not only are the interest rate rises in smaller steps, but 
the increases are delayed considerably more than is the case with 
private sector loans. Rural Bank interest rate reviews are much 
further apart typically one year as compared with 3 months or less 
for loans from the private sector. 
An important aspect of higher interest rates is the increasing 
financial leverage of farmers. Traditionally farmers have a low debt 
to equity ratio in order to maintain their security through adverse 
seasons. Results from the 1983 Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service 
survey of sheep, and beef farmers reveal that 50 per cent have 84 per 
cent equity or better. Despite this many farmers have a cash flow 
problem and nearly 40 per cent are spending at least 20 per cent of 
their gross earnings on interest alone (Taylor, 1985). 
Although 
1980-82 boom in 
This is partly 
primarily it is 
debt serv~c1ng 
1980 (Table 6). 
the average debt to equity ratio improved during the 
farmland prices, security has declined since 1980. 
the result of a small subsequent decline in equity but 
because farmers' financial leverage - in terms of their 
to income ratios - has increased significantly since 
14. 
TABLE 6 
Interest as a Percentage of Gross Farm Income 
(Sheep and Beef Farms) 
======================================================================= 
Year 1977 / 1978/ 1979/ 1980/ 1981/ 1982/ 1983/ 1ge4/ 1985/ 
78 79 80 81 82 83 84E 85E 86E 
% 10.2 9.5 9.5 10.7 12.7 13 .3 12.4 11.4 14.0 
======================================================================= 
E Estimates 
Source: Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service 
Associated with this increase in leverage is the increase in 
interest costs as a percentage of total farm expenditure (Table 7). 
This affects farmers' flexibility as the cost cannot generally be 
reduced in poor seasons as can be done with most other farm expenses. 
TABLE 7 
Interest as a Percentage of Total Farm Expenditure 
(Sheep and Beef Farms) 
======================================================================= 
Year 1977 / 1978/ 1979/ 1980/ 1981/ 1982/ 1983/ 1984/ 1985/ 
78 79 80 81 82 83 84E 85E 86E 
% 14% 14% 14% 14.6% 16.3% 18% 15.4% 14.8% 17.7% 
======================================================================= 
E Estimates 
Source: Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service 
In both Tables 6 and 7 the effect of interest rate controls and 
the Government directed reduction in Rural Bank interest rates can be 
seen in the fall in the ratios in the 1983/84 year. The fall is 
repeated in the 1984/85 financial year because of a substantial 
increase in gross income and in total expenditure as farmers increased 
their expenditure in line with their higher income. 
In 1985/86 the upward trend in financial leverage is estimated 
to resume with the ratios returning to the levels existing before the 
introduction of general interest rate controls and the devaluation. 
Unless there is a substantial improvement in meat and wool prices 
farmers financial leverage should increase above the previous highs as 
higher interest rates are applied to a greater proportion of farm 
loans. 
Farmers, both in horticulture and agriculture, who borrow most 
of their funds from private financial institutions were the first to 
bear the cost of the removal of Government subsidies. Following 
deregulation in July 1984 private sector interest rates at loan reviews 
rose steadily from the regulated 11 and 14 per cent to the current 
levels of 18-22 per cent. 
Higher interest rates were not introduced by Government 
institutions lending to the rural sector until after the Budget of 
November 1984. Not only was the introduction of interest rate 
increases delayed in the case of those institutions but the increases 
are programmed in steps rather than applied immediately. 
On the surface this appears to give farmers borrowing from the 
Government insitutions an easier adjustment to the removal of 
subsidies. However, many clients of the Rural Bank, Lands and Survey 
Department and the Department of Maori Affairs have been assisted onto 
their farms with much lower equity than would be prudent for private 
sector borrowers. This was feasible only because of the low interest 
rates which were offered. The consequent high level of debt results, 
even at subsidised interest rates, in interest payments accounting for 
a large proportion of their farm costs. Although on average their 
interest rate increases are smaller, the increase in their total 
interest payments is likely to be more substantial than for clients of 
the private institutions. 
3.2 Availability of Funds 
The biggest change in the financing of agriculture in the last 
twelve months has been in the availability of finance. While interest 
rate controls were imposed, farm credit, in particular term and 
mortgage finance, was very difficult to obtain for all except borrowers 
offering prime security. Now finance is much more readily obtainable 
from traditional private institutional lenders ( particularly 
medium-term finance) and even Rural Bank finance is less scarce. 
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Freeing of interest rates has contributed to this change by 
curbing the growth in demand from farmers. It has also encouraged more 
deposits back into the institutions. Devaluation has also contributed 
to the improvement in the availability of finance. The consequent 
reduction in the exchange risk attracted more funds into New Zealand. 
These funds have arrived as deposits with financial institutions and 
increasingly as direct loans to New Zealand companies and farmers. 
WHh less need for high cost forward cover offshore borrowing has 
become an attractive option to farmers. 
With the exception of off-shore loans there appears to be 
little likelihood of much improvement in the availability of long-term 
finance. Most private sector lending is for terms of less than 10 
years and the Rural Bank is still by far the major source of long-term 
finance. Although the Rural Bank has a reasonable supply as a result 
of the current fall in demand even this source may dry up as more of 
its funding has to be found on the commercial market. 
A further change in the last nine months which will affect the 
availability of credit to agriculture was the withdrawal of a Reserve 
Bank directive for some financial institutions to hold a minimum 
percentage of their investments in agriculture, or alternatively in 
export industries generally. This had given agriculture some advantage 
especially while credit was in short supply. In practice not only were 
funds more readily supplied to agriculture but they tended to be 
provided at better than average rates. 
Agriculture no longer enjoys these privileges and must compete 
on equal terms with other sectors. Now farmers' ability to attract 
funds will depend primarily on the security they can offer and their 
ability to service loans. 
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The other factor will be the degree of exposure to agriculture 
which the various institutions are prepared to assume. This may be 
declining. Farmers are generally recognised as a good risk in 
comparison to other small business people they tend to have a greater 
interest in their asset and will try harder to meet their commitments 
and hold on to their farm. But now many farmers are facing a 
significant decline in incomes and in the value of their assets. As a 
result some financial institutions are concerned and are now reviewing 
their exposure to the agricultural sector, especially in view of the 
fact that the industrial sector continues to enjoy a high level of 
protection enabling it to compete more favourably for funds against 
agriculture. 
3.3 Effect on Farm Investment 
The removal of support for agriculture, in 
support for sheepmeat producers in the form of SMPs 
Government loans is beginning to encourage change. 
particular 
and low 
the 
cost 
A trend towards greater diversification is already occurring 
and is likely to accelerate during 1985/86 as farmers more fully 
appreciate the seriousness of the downturn in sheep farm incomes. The 
main attractions at present appear to be deer and goat farming but 
horticulture and forestry are also attracting some interest. 
Significant moves to diversify may be confined to farmers in a strong 
financial position as the capital inputs could be too costly to service 
for those farmers who already have a high degree of financial leverage. 
In addition to change in the form of diversification there is also 
change occurring in the type and amount of capital expenditure. The 
heavy expenditure in recent years on buildings and pasture development 
is being curtailed and although there has been some increase in 
development expenditure in 1984/85 this has largely been on 
consolidating development through improving water supplies and fencing. 
The increase in capital expenditure in 1984/85 would have also been 
influenced by extra capital purchases to take advantage of the 
Agricultural Investment Allowance before its termination on 31 March 
1985. 
The outlook for 1985/86 is for a 62 per cent fall in capital 
expenditure for sheep and beef farmers reflecting farmers' need to 
retrench in the face of declining gross incomes and rising costs. 
Dairy farmers are expected to cut back capital expenditure by 45 per 
cent. Although their gross incomes are likely to be maintained the 
cutbacks are likely to be necessary because of cost increases (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, March 1985). 
In all sectors of farming the combination of tax changes, 
removal of subsidies and high market rates of interest is having a very 
important impact on farmers' largest investment - land. With the 
change to a "more-market" approach for agriculture farmland has come to 
be recognised as considerably overvalued in some areas. There are few 
buyers despite the fact that asking prices are now often below 
Government valuation. Marginal farmland has been particularly affected 
by the current review of farmland prices. 
This reappraisal of farmland values has been indicated since 
the early 1970's. Since the land boom of 1972/74 real values of 
farmland have become increasingly out of step with the real value of 
other equity investments (Figure 2). 
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The readjustment 
supported on the basis 
financial year (Table 8). 
of land values towards a value which can be 
of earning capacity began in the 1982/83 
It is almost certain that this downward adjustment has 
continued and that equity is being squeezed out between falling capital 
values and rising debts. The 1983/84 year was an exception as the All 
Farmland Price Index (Valuation Department) recorded an approximate 4 
per cent rise in the value of fattening and grazing properties which 
was not offset by the 11 per cent increase in debt (a smaller base). 
The apparent fall since June 1984 in the value of farmland 
over-all is possibly a reflection of farmers' price expectations and 
their opinion of the likely movement in costs. In the 1984 Survey of 
New Zealand Farmer Intentions and Opinions farmers' expectation of 
inflation for 1984/85 was 13.5 per cent. This view of the inflation 
rate was not accompanied by a very optimistic outlook on the market 
prospects for some major agricultural exports (Table 9). As a result 
farmers' projections of returns from farming must be falling and the 
value of land is being measured accordingly. 
This apparent fall in farmland prices is only just beginning to 
be reflected in the Valuation Departments' farmland indices. In the 
half-year ended June 1984 all types of farmland were still showing 
increases in value and the All Farmland Price Index increased by nearly 
4 percent. In the December 1984 half-year grazing and fattening 
farmland prices showed a renewed decline but dairy. arable and 
horticultural farmland continued to record increases so that the All 
Farmland Index still increased by 0.5 per cent. 
From Table 10 it can also be seen that overall, farmers equity 
has not declined significantly since the peak of the land boom in 1982. 
Although debt increased by 22 per cent between March 1982 and March 
1984, this was more than offset by increases in capital value. Why the 
Valuation Department statistics do not correspond with Real Estate 
Agents' reports of significant declines in some farmland values is not 
clear. The delay between sales and the Department receiving sale 
notices is possibly one factor. Another explanation may be increases 
in the value of smaller blocks of land used as "lifestyle farms" which 
could be offsetting the apparent decline in the value of larger 
economic units. 
TABLE 8 
Sheep and Beef Farms Neasures of Economic Profitability 
(Weighted Average of All Farm Classes) 
=================================================================:===================================================================== 
( I ) (2) (3) (4 ) (5) (6) 
Equivalent to Total 
Less Gain in Taxable Return Return 
Assessed Return Equity on Equity on Equity 
Equity Net Farm Managerial on Equity Capital Capital of: Capital of 
Capital Liabilities Capital Interest Income(a) Reward Capitalili)(Non-tax) (Taxable (3) + (5) 
Year $ $ $ $ $ $ Equiv.@ 30% rate) 
1978 340,991 80,614 260,377 5,070 13,888 9,380 1.7% 6.2% 8.9% 10.6 
1979 430,132 90,285 399,847 5,848 19,494 11 ,452 2.4% 30.4% 43.4% 45.8 
1980 558,120 99,267 458,853 7,438 24,772 13,685 2.4% 35.0% 50.0% 52.4 
1981 709,156 112,488 596,668 8,964 21,698 16,507 0.9% 30.0% 42.9% 43.8 
1982 807,589 137,744 669,845 10,896 21,401 19,431 <0.1% 12.3% 17.6% 17.6 
1983 797,426 153,715 643,711 14,782 23,396 19,420 <0.1% -3.9% -5.6% -5.6 
1984* 12,900 20,500 
1985* 14,700 29,600 
1986* 16,200 24,400 
======================================================================================================================================== 
'" Estimates 
NOTES: (a) Net Farm Income has to meet personal living expenses, taxation commitments, capital repayments, the purchase 
of capital items and any other investments. 
(b) Net Income - assessed managerial award. 
SOURCE: Compiled from Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service Survey Data. 
\0 
20. 
TABLE 9 
Farmer Opinion on Future Market Prospects 
for Agricultural Produce 
======================================================================= 
Optimistic 
(per cent) 
SHORT TERM 
Sheep Meat 14.5 
Beef 48.4 
Wool 41.4 
Dairy Produce 16.9 
Horticultural Produce 54.6 
Deer Industry Produce 51.9 
Goat Industry Produce 39.5 
MEDIUM TERM 
Sheep Neat 21.6 
Beef 35.5 
Wool 46.0 
Dairy Produce 16.1 
Horticultural Produce 45.3 
Deer Industry Produce 39.6 
Goat Industry Produce 35.0 
LONG TERM 
Sheep Neat 37.8 
Beef 34.3 
Wool 50.8 
Dairy Produce 27.5 
Horticultural Produce 43.8 
Deer Industry Produce 32.8 
Goat Industry Produce 34.7 
Reasonably 
Satisfied 
(per cent) 
38.2 
43.9 
51.6 
49.7 
39.5 
39.0 
36.5 
47.1 
53.9 
48.4 
48.4 
46.3 
49.2 
44.0 
34.0 
51.0 
42.6 
37.8 
40.3 
45.1 
41.3 
Pessimistic 
(per cent) 
47.3 
7.7 
7.0 
33.4 
5.9 
9.1 
24.0 
31.3 
10.6 
5.6 
35.5 
8.4 
11.2 
21.0 
28.2 
14.7 
6.6 
34.7 
15.9 
22.1 
24.0 
======================================================================= 
Source: Pryde and 
Intentions 
responses) 
McCartin (1985): Survey of New Zealand Farmer 
and Opinions {Progress result based on 1,543 valid 
TABLE 10 
FARM CAPITAL AND DEBT 
as at 31st March ($m) 
========================================================================================================================== 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Net Equalised 
Capital Valne 
of Count ies ( I) 
13,754 
15,219 
17,650 
29, 17 I 
40,892 
45, 190 
50,482 
Estimate of 
Total Farming 
Capital (2) 
17,192 
19,024 
22,062 
36,464 
5 I, 115 
56,488 
63,102 
Loans Outstanding 
to the 
Agricultural Sector (3) 
2,362 
2,851 
3,453 
4,196 
5,216 
5,833 
6,481 
Equity 
14,830 
16, 173 
18,609 
32,268 
45,899 
50,655 
56,621 
Equity 
as a 
percentage 
86.3 
85.0 
84.4 
88.5 
89.8 
89.7 
89.7 
========================================================================================================================== 
(I) An estimate of the current value of all counties,not just those revalued in the current year, but excluding properties 
that are not rated e.g. unoccupied crown lands, churches, schools. 
(2) Assuming land and buildings accounts for 80% of total farm capital. 
N 
(3) Derived from data contained in "Survey of Farmer Intentions and Opinions" (1978-84). 

SECTION 4 
THE CREDIT MARKET 
4.1 Developments in the Financial Sector 
4. L 1 General 
The Government's moves towards deregulation of the financial 
sector and of maintaining tight liquidity through a particularly active 
public debt sales programme has considerably stiffened competition for 
funds. 
There has always been competition for funds but with the 
removal of interest rate controls the competition is now centred 
primarily on price rather than on financial services offered or 
availability of funds for future borrowing by the depositor. Because 
the higher prices are being paid by all institutions depositors 
recognise that there will be little likelihood of obtaining 
significantly cheaper finance in the future from a particular 
institution and therefore deposits are being made on the basis of 
current income rather than savings when borrowing in the future. 
The margins between borrowing and lending which financial 
institutions have traditionally been obtaining are also likely to be 
reduced following deregulation. These margins will be squeezed between 
the rising cost of funds - as those requiring funds compete against the 
Government which has a large internal deficit and is maintaining a 
tight monetary policy - and consumer resistance to 20 per cent plus 
interest rates. 
The removal of reserve asset requirements is unlikely to help 
the funding situation until the interest rates being paid on current 
Government stock issues are reduced. Selling low interest bearing 
stocks to free funds for private sector investments is not really a 
viable alternative for most institutions because of the capital losses 
which would be involved. 
One move, which is likely to result from increased competition 
both for funds and in margins is increasing specialisation by 
institutions in order to make the best use of their funds and expertise 
and to reduce overheads. This may be particularly so of the finance 
companies owned by the trading banks. In most cases they were 
established to overcome the "30 day rule" preventing trading banks from 
paying interest on deposits of less than one month. With the removal 
of this rule their original purpose has been lost. Specialisation in 
some aspect of financing such as discounting, or venture capital 
funding could give new purpose to these companies. 
4.1.2 Farm Financing 
An advantage of this increasing competition and specialisation 
could be a move towards meeting the needs of the Rural Sector with more 
appropriate finance proposals. Already there has been a considerable 
move towards providing badly needed long term (greater than 10 year) 
finance through off-shore borrowing facilities. Many institutions are 
also starting to recognise the cash flow difficulties of developing 
agricultural enterprises (especially those with long-term horticultural 
crops) and providing greater amounts of funding on an interest only 
23. 
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basis. 
The deregulation of the finance industry has put the cost of 
finance back to pre Wage and Price Freeze levels and more, but the 
higher cost has been offset to some degree by the improved availability 
of funds particularly to new enterprises capable of showing a high 
return on investment. Previously investment in these was stifled 
because funds tended to go to more secure but usually less profitable 
propositions. 
4.2 Total Agricultural Lending and Market Shares 
Considering the capital invested in the farming sector total 
farmer indebtedness is not high. As at March 1984 indebtedness was 
estimated to have reached $6.7 billion. This compares with an 
estimated total capital invested of more than $63 billion. The 
breakdown of this debt between sources of credit is shown in Tables 11 
and 12. 
Within this total debt there have been considerable changes in 
the importance of the various institutional sources of agricultural 
credit. The changes in real terms are illustrated in Figure 3. 
4.3 Government Sources 
4.3.1 Rural Banking and Finance Corporation 
The Rural Bank is by far the largest single lender to 
agriculture supplying over 30 per cent of total credit used in 
agriculture. In comparison family loans are the next most important 
source providing 15 per cent of the credit used. Trading Banks, the 
largest source of private institutional credit were supplying just 12 
per cent of total agriculture credit as at March 1984. 
This growth in importance of the Rural Bank occurred mainly in 
the period 1970-84. During this time inflation quickly raised the cost 
of private sector borrowing while Rural Bank rates (Table 15) were held 
at low levels by the Government in order to compensate the agricultural 
sector for the overvalued exchange rate. the poor terms of trade and 
the higher cost of farm inputs as a result of industrial protection in 
New Zealand. On many units the low Rural Bank rates made further 
investment economic. 
Naturally whenever farmers could meet the non-price criteria 
for obtaining a Rural Bank loan they would take up the Rural Bank loan 
rather than a private loan primarily because of the lower cost but also 
because of the longer terms that were available. It is unclear whether 
this situation reduced the role of private lending institutions. Tight 
liquidity in the economy over the last decade usually meant that 
private institutions could not meet the demand for credit. As a result 
the main impact of the Rural Bank is more likely to have been to expand 
the total agricultural credit market rather than just taking a greater 
share of the normal market. . 
Whatever the reasons behind the growth of the Rural Bank 
lending its impact on the agricultural credit market has been 
particularly felt in the last two years. In 1983/84 its influence was 
used by the Government to bring down interest rates. First its own 
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TABLE 11 
Loans Outstanding to the Agricultural Sector 
as at March 31st ($m) 
================================================================================= 
Source 
Stock & Station Agents 
Trading Banks 
Trustee Banks 
Private Savings Banks 
Finance Companies 
1977 
247 
181 
25 
15 
50* 
Development Finance Corporation 
Building Societies 
5* 
39 
Insurance Companies 
Department of Maori Affairs 
Department of Lands & Survey 
Marginal Land Board 
Rural Bank 
Solicitors Trust Funds 
Family Loans 
Private Sources 
Trust Companies 
Local Body Loans 
Dairy Companies 
Other 
154 
27 
77 
24 
584 
-.01 
334 
81 
98 
15 
21 
8 
1978 
249 
299 
27 
15 
52 
6* 
42 
166 
32 
87 
26 
694 
120 
364 
104 
102 
17 
24 
16 
1979 
270 
292 
48 
29 
51 
7* 
46 
181 
34 
85 
39 
859 
153 
423 
141 
113 
23 
28 
29 
1980 
353 
348 
48 
35 
82 
6* 
49 
210 
38 
108 
30 
1043 
194 
490 
187 
124 
29 
33 
46 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
403 
467 
67 
37 
113 
6* 
54 
256 
47 
126 
32 
1242 
247 
569 
250 
135 
38 
39 
68 
431 
658 
111 
40 
156 
19* 
61 
303 
58 
158 
33 
1510 
318 
675 
337 
148 
50 
47 
103 
414 
674 
142 
25 
161 
40* 
69 
354 
73 
190 
1820 
493 
806 
141 
16 
223 
55 
82 
354 
85 
214 
2026 
389 462 
880 1050 
309 330 
164 165 
42 46 
26 33 
61 66 
Total 2,086 2,362 2,851 3,453 4,196 5,216 5,833 6,730 
================================================================================= 
* Estimates 
NOTES (1) Reserve Bank statistics and annual reports 
(2) Estimates from Farmer Opinion Surveys, Pryde (1978), Pryde 
and McCartin (1982-85) 
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TABLE 12 
Distribution of Farmers Total Liabilities at End of 
the 1983/84 Financial Year (Per Cent) 
========================================================;============== 
Source 
Rural Bank 
Other Government 
Trustee Savings Banks 
Trading Banks 
Building Societies 
Insurance Companies 
Stock & Station Agents 
Trust Companies 
Solicitors Trustee Funds 
Family 
Private Sources 
Local Bodies 
Finance Companies 
Dairy Companies 
Private Savings Banks 
Others 
TOTAL 
Share of 
Total 
Lending 
34.8 
4.3 
2.1 
11.0 
0.7 
9.1 
3.9 
2.2 
7.7 
12.5 
5.8 
0.7 
2.2 
0.6 
<0.1 
2.4 
100.0 
Share of 
Long Term 
Lending 
52.7 
7.3 
2.7 
1.6 
0.7 
13.6 
0.6 
0.9 
1.6 
12.4 
2.5 
1.1 
0.1 
0.2 
<0.1 
2.0 
100.0 
Share of Share of 
Hedium Term Long Term 
Lending Lending 
28.6 
1.3 
2.0 
14.4 
0.7 
5.5 
1.7 
3.5 
7.4 
14.7 
11.9 
0.6 
3.9 
0.9 
<0.1 
2.9 
100.0 
3.1 
1.3 
0.7 
27.9 
0.5 
3.6 
13.9 
3.3 
21.5 
10.9 
6.5 
<0.1 
5.6 
1.2 
<0.1 
3.0 
100.0 
======================================================================= 
SOUl{CE: 
NOTES: 
2. 
Pryde and HcCartin (1985), Survey of NZ Farmer Intentions And 
Opinions. 
Long Term 
Medium Term -
Short Term 
over 10 years 
3-10 years 
under 3 years 
The s~rvey includes only farms of 20 ha or more. 
( I) 
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lending rates were reduced at a time when commercial interest rates 
were showing little sign of falling. Secondly the Rural Bank's 
position as second or subsequent mortgagee on most farm properties was 
used to bring down interest rates on private sector mortgages which had 
a higher priority - this was done by refusing to grant priority upon 
renewal of the mortgage unless the interest rates were reduced to the 
Government guidelines. 
In 1984/85 the Rural Bank's role in influencing interest rates 
was completely changed and not only did it cease to try and reduce 
commercial rates of interest but its own interest rates were increased. 
This process is to be continued in steps so that ultimately Rural Bank 
interest rates should reach levels at or near market rates. 
The Rural Bank interest rate increase is being introduced in 
steps (Table 13) in acknowledgement of the Bank's past role ~ ~hrough 
assisting farmers to invest in otherwise uneconomic farm purchases and 
development of increasing production and export earnings for New 
Zealand. 
TABLE 13 
Changes in Interest Rates on Rural Bank Loans 
- Assuming Market Indicator Rate remains at 15 per cent 
===========:=========================================================== 
Oct.84 
Rates 
Existing Loans 
-Annual Review 
7.5 % 
9.5 % 
11.0 % 
- 3 yr Review 
7.5 % 
9.5 % 
11.0 % 
- 5 yr Review 
7.5 % 
9.5 % 
11.0 % 
New Loans 
1984/85 
10 
12 
85/86 
11 
13 
New Rates 
86/87 
12 
14 
87/88 88/89 89/90 
13 14 15 
15 ---------------
15 ---------------------------------------
7.5 
9.5 
11.0 
7.5 
9.5 
11.0 
12.5 
7.5 
9.5 
11.0 
7.5 
9.5 
11.0 
12.5 
12 
14 
13 14 15 
15 ---------------
15 -----------------------
7.5 
9.5 
11.0 
13.5 
7.5 
9.5 
11.0 
14.5 
14 15 
15 -------
15 -------
15 -------
======================================================================= 
SOURCE: 1984 Budget 
Despite the stepped increase in rates Rural Bank clients will 
suffer much higher cost increases than the average. This is partly 
because of the greater proportional increase in interest rates 
experienced by Rural Bank borrowers than experienced by private 
borrowers. Although market rates fell following the introduction of 
interest rate regulations the response was very slow and the average 
for existing loans had not fallen far by the time the controls were 
lifted in July 1984. In contrast Rural Bank rates had been at very low 
average levels even before interest rate controls were introduced and 
had to have major increases to bring them up to market levels (Table 
14). 
TABLE 14 
Proportions of Rural Bank Lending at 
Various Interest Rates - as at 31 March 1984 
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Farms Industrial Total 
$m % $m % $m % 
Up to 7.5% 1,088.3 52.5 10.4 5.1 1,098.7 48.2 
7.6% to 9.5% 844.3 40.7 8.7 4.2 853.0 37.4 
9.6% to 11.0% 134.5 6.5 125.6 60.8 260.1 11.4 
11.1% to 14% 6.6 0.3 61.7 29.9 68.3 3.0 
2,073.7 100.0 206.4 100.0 2,280.1 100.0 
SOURCE: Report of the Rural Banking and Finance Corporation (1984) 
In addition to the higher proportional increase in interest 
rates Rural Bank clients have a much higher than average debt to equity 
ratio. This is usually because they have embarked on large development 
programmes or because they are new to farm ownership. As a result 
their debt servicing commitment in some regions has been twice that of 
the average farmer. 
Table 15 shows how the Rural Bank's new lending rates fell 
behind private sector rates on new mortgages. The Rural Bank's rates 
were increased in the 1984 Budget and will increase in further steps to 
the market indicator rate but it will be some years before they reach 
commercial rates unless commercial rates fall from their current level. 
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TABLE 15 
Mortgage Interest Rates (New Lending) 
======================================================================= 
Average(a) Rural Bank Rates % 
As at Rate % 
March (Exc1. Settlement Development Refinance 
Govt.) Standard Higher Standard Higher Standard Higher 
1973 8.27 7.0 8.0 5.5-7 6-8 7 8 
1974 8.42 7.0 8.0 5.5-7 6-8 I 8 
1975 8.61 7.0 8.0 5.5-7 6-8 7 8 
Standard Conc- Standard Conc- Standard Conc-
ession ession ession 
Rates Rates Rates 
1976 9.97 7.5 7.5 5.5 8.5 
1977 11.20 7.5 7.5 5.5 8.5 
1978 11.55 8.5 7.5 8.5 6.0 9.5 
1979 12.02 8.5 7.5 8.5 6.0 9.5 
1980 13.24 9.0 7.5 9.0 6.0 11.0 
1981 14.87 
1982 16.51 9.0 7.5 9-11 7.5 11.0 
1983 17.30 9.0 7.5 9-11 7.5 11.0 
1984 13.53 7.5 7.5-9.5 9.5 
1985 18.50E 12.5 12.5 12.5 
======================================================================= 
(a) Includes mortgages on all types of real property 
E Estimate 
Sources: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Rural Banking and Finance Corporation 
The establishment of a new Commercial Division of the Rural 
Bank has been another major change. Although the Rural Bank was 
intended at establishment to bid on the open market for some of its 
funds it was not until 1983 that the Minister of Finance's approval was 
finally obtained. The first public loan market issue was made on 1 
February 1984 for a total of $25m and was fully subscribed within 3 
weeks. 
The Commercial Division's role is to provide funds to a wide 
range of activities in the primary sector, which could not be 
accommodated under the lending policies which had to be applied to 
Government subsidised funds. Now the more commercial propositions can 
also be financed as part of a new total package for the primary sector. 
In the November 1984 Budget it was announced that the Rural 
I3ank was to ultimately seek all its new funds on the open market. Its 
access to new Loans Account (Government) funds is to be phased out by 
April 1986. In order to preserve its position as the leading financier 
of agriculture the Rural I3ank will therefore have to meet increasing 
competition for funds. 
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4.3.2 Development Finance Corporation of New Zealand 
Development Finance Corporation is a unique institution in New 
Zealand. As a development bank it specialises in providing longer-term 
and higher-risk finance and is committed to promoting economic change 
and development in New Zealand. 
In 1980 the Corporation committed itself to the financial 
support of horticultural developments in New Zealand. This commitment 
was followed up by research into the potential of various horticultural 
crops and into the finance needs of the horticultural industry. 
After identifying 
horticultural development 
range of financing packages 
the specific needs of those 
the Corporation designed a 
designed to meet those needs. 
undertaking 
comprehensive 
The success of this approach was reflected in the rapid 
increase in the amount of Development Finance Corporation loans taken 
up by horticultural developers. Up to 1980 annual approvals were less 
than $1 million. This increased to figures of $8 million in 1981, $20 
million in 1982, $18 million in 1983 and $23 million in 1984. 
The Corporation's exposure to horticulture stood at $54 million 
in 1984 making it a significant new investor in the agricultural sector 
with nearly one per cent of total agricultural debt. Factors in the 
past which made this level of borrowing from DFC significant were: the 
relatively high cost of DFC funding in relation to traditional 
agricultural investors such as the Rural Bank, Trading Banks and 
Insurance Companies which in turn meant higher lending rates; the 
recent arrival of DFC into the market; and its emphasis on development 
investment rather than simply land investment. 
The Corporation offers financing facilities to the 
horticultural industry ranging from crop finance through plant and 
equipment finance to venture capital for the development of new 
technology. 
4.3.3 Department of Maori Affairs 
Encouragement of better use of Maori land by the Maori owners 
is an important part of the Department's activities. This 
encouragement is provided through a Rural Lending Account (funded from 
the Public Account) and a Maori Land Development Fund which is funded 
from income from Maori Land which is farmed by the Department on behalf 
of the owners. 
Development loans in the past, were provided from the Rural 
Lending Account to Maori farmers farming both Maori land and general 
land. However, with increasing demand particularly for horticulture 
development loans and limited funding, priority is now being given to 
the development of Maori land and individual Maori farmers farming 
general land are referred to other lending agencies. In the year to 
March 1984 $9.2 million was advanced from this account. 
The Maori Land Development Fund is a revolving fund used to 
finance development on Maori Land (mostly pastoral stations) which the 
Department farms on behalf of the owners. 
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In total the Maori Affairs Department had nearly $82 million 
invested in farming from these two accounts. 
4.3.4 Department of Lands and Survey 
The Department's lending activities to agriculture now arise 
primarily out of its role as a vendor of Crown land. Its work of 
lending to farmers for the development of Marginal Land through the 
Marginal Land Board was passed on to the Rural Bank in 1983. 
The greater part of the Department's advances to farmers to 
help them purchase Crown land are provided through the Deferred Payment 
Licence scheme under which lessees of Crown land can freehold the land 
and pay the purchase price in instalments over a period of years rather 
than paying cash. The other major lending activity is the financing of 
young farmers settling Crown Land under Part VI of the Land Act 1948. 
Total lending under these schemes to 31 March 1984 was $214m which 
places the Department as possibly the fourth largest individual lender 
to agriculture. 
Sales of Crown land under Part VI of the Land Act 1948 were 
suspended in 1984/85 as a result of measures in the November 1984 
Budget which made settlement uneconomic at current land prices. 
Following the suspension of sales the Lands and Survey Department is 
undertaking a review of its role in land settlement. If the 
Government's more market" approach to agriculture is successful in 
restoring farmland prices more into relativity with returns from 
agricultural production then the Department may no longer have to 
compensate young farmers for imperfections in the land market. 
4.4 Private Institutional Sources 
4.4.1 Trading Banks 
As a group trading banks are the most significant source of 
agricultural credit after the Rural Bank and family loans. They have a 
particularly active role in horticulture (Table 16). This increase in 
horticulture lending is also reflected in the growth of lending in the 
Reserve Bank statistics' "other farming" category in which horticulture 
comprises approximately 25 per cent of loans. 
TABLE 16 
Contributions to Rural Credit 
Percentage as at June 1983 
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======================================================================= 
Contributor 
Rural Bank 
Other Government 
Local Government 
Trustee Banks 
Trading Banks 
Building Societies 
Insurance Companies 
Stock and Station 
Companies 
Finance Companies 
Solictor's Funds 
"Family Loan 
Private Sources 
other than Family 
Other 
Agriculture 
(excluding Horticulture) 
36.27 
4.36 
0.76 
2.90 
8.47 
0.55 
9.94 
2.70 
2.33 
6.74 
15.49 
5.11 
4.38 
100.00 
Sources: Pryde and McCartin (1984) 
Department of Statistics 
Horticulture 
18.66 
3.00 
0.62 
2.28 
18.43 
1.11 
2.89 
2.02 
4.68 
9.02 
17.38 
10.40 
9.51 
100.00 
By far the greatest role of trading banks is in short-to 
medium-term (less than 10 year) lending. This takes the form of 
overdraft facilities and term lending. Because of increasing 
competition for funds, uncertainty in the finance market and to a 
certain extent the undisciplined use of overdraft facilities by 
farmers, banks are shifting the emphasis in their lending from 
overdraft facilities to term loans. 
With the moves towards deregulation of the finance industry, 
firstly during the 1976-81 period and then again from July 1984, 
trading bank lending policies have also become more flexible. This has 
its effects in decentralisation of decision making - so that loans are 
made with more regard to individual circumstances - and with more 
lending packages appropriate to the needs of agriculture. Examples of 
the latter are deferred principal loans and the development of total 
finance packages for family operated horticultural units. 
The cost of trading bank finance has moved up quickly in line 
with the cost of funds as term loans interest rates and particularly 
overdraft interest rates can be reviewed at short notice. With the 
Reserve Bank requirement to favour agriculture no longer in force rates 
on farm loans now follow the general shift in interest rates. 
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The demand from agriculture for trading bank funds at the 
of writing is low due mainly to the high cost of borrowing and to 
extent industry uncertainties resulting from the Budget changes 
changes in world markets. 
time 
some 
and 
In addition to the lower demand there has also been a 
significant reduction in seasonal requirements as farmers benefit from 
a good 1984/85 growing season and better prices as a result of 
devaluation. This is expected to reverse during the last quarter of 
1985 when the demand should increase to a level around 10 percent above 
the previous year. The demand is expected to be even stronger during 
1985/86 as the effects of recent policy changes filter through into 
costs without corresponding increases in prices. 
Overall, banks 
demand for finance but 
lending and the valuation 
land values in some areas 
are likely to be in a position to fund the 
will be taking a more cautious approach to 
of farm property, taking into account falling 
and recent Budget measures. 
4.4.2 Stock and Station Agents. 
Stock and Station Agents endeavor to confine their lending to 
seasonal finance. Poor farm incomes over the past three years have 
contributed to seasonal finance becoming hard core debt. However the 
rise in farm incomes for the 1984/85 season has resulted in some 
reduction in this hard core debt. Improved availability of finance 
from other institutions following the 1984 removal of interest rate 
controls has allowed the transfer of further hard core seasonal finance 
to term loan accounts. 
For Stock and Station Agents the rising cost of funds from the 
mid 1970's until 1983 and a series of controls on their interest rates 
impaired their ability to attract sufficient funds to meet demand. 
Following the decontrol of interest rates the higher cost of borrowing 
is reducing the demand for funds and Stock and Station Agents are 
generally in the position of being able to service the requirements of 
clients who can maintain a viable operation. 
Their ability to meet demand was tested at the beginning of the 
1984/85 season when seasonal requirements were 30 percent higher than 
the previous year. The market appears to have settled for the present 
with seasonal borrowings being on a par with the previous season. Over 
the next 2-3 years the demand is expected to pick up again by around 10 
percent annually. 
A recent development in Stock and Station Agent's farm 
financing has been closer association with finance companies, 
particularly those within the corporate group. Perhaps through this 
association more innovative financing packages are being developed such 
as the financing of syndicate operations, leasing arrangements for 
deer, goats and bloodstock and term loans with flexible capital 
repayments. 
4.4.3 Life Insurance Companies 
Life Insurance Companies are the main source of long-term 
credit after the Rural Bank. Their share of long-term lending has been 
increasing over the past three years as their real level of lending has 
increased and other lenders (including the Rural Bank) have moved 
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towards reducing the average term of loans. Between 1982 and 1984 Life 
Insurance Companies' share of long-term lending increased from 10.1 per 
cent to 13.6 per cent (Pryde and McCartin 1983, 1985). 
Figure 1 shows the declining importance of Life Insurance 
Companies up until 1980. This was most probably due to lack of funds 
as demand for finance by farmers invariably exceeded supply. The 
reversal occured in 1980 when recession made the public more security 
conscious and their life insurance investments increased. This 
increase was passed on into farm lending as until 1984 Life Insurance 
Companies were obliged to invest 20 per cent of their funds in farm and 
housing loans. 
The removal of this Government requirement has not greatly 
affected the Life Insurance Companies' rate of investment in 
agriculture in the short-term. Increasing interest rates have had 
greater impact by depressing demand. This fall in demand means that 
Life Insurance Companies are now in a position to meet requests for 
finance where the farmer has suitable security and life insurance 
association and has the ability to service the resultant debt. 
Generally, lending policies to agriculture have not changed 
over the last 12 months, though farm mortgages are not now as likely to 
attract the preferential interest rates which they have in the past. 
4.4.4 Finance Companies 
~lost of the agricultural lending by finance companies is for 
the purchase of machinery. However some companies have become involved 
with other forms of agricultural lending such as crop finance and land 
purchase. This move occured during the late 1970's and early 1980's 
when kiwifruit development was at its peak. 
With the tightening of the money supply and imposition of 
controls on interest rates in 1983 these companies became concerned 
with their exposure to agriculture and in particular horticulture. 
Perhaps as a reaction to this the share of total lending to agriculture 
taken by finance companies declined slightly between 1983 and 1984. 
Finance companies 
little lending for terms of 
an analysis of short-term 
companies provide nearly 6 
by finance companies meets 
agriculture. 
4.4.5 Trust Companies 
are primarily short-term lenders with very 
more than three years. This is revealed in 
lending to agriculture of which finance 
per cent. In comparison long-term lending 
only 0.1 per cent of the total used in 
Trust companies were one of the traditional long term 
financiers of agriculture but had a much smaller role than insurance 
companies. They are not covered in Reserve Bank financial statistics 
which makes it difficult to assess their contribution to agriculture 
and any changes that have occured over recent years. From the results 
of a survey of farmer opinion (Pryde and McCartin, 1985) Trust 
companies appear to contribute 2.2 per cent of total agricultural 
credit (Table 12). 
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There has been little if any change in trust companies' lending 
policies towards agriculture over the past two years. Currently there 
is limited demand for their funds and depending on the debt servicing 
ability of the applicant they are able to meet all propositions as they 
arise. 
4.4.6 Trustee Banks 
Trustee Banks have grown in importance as agricultural lenders 
in recent years and their contribution is now on a par with that of 
Trust companies and Finance companies. 
Lending is primarily in the form of long-term mortgages and 
medium- term "term loans". Government approval was given in 1981 for 
Trustee Banks to offer overdraft facilities but by 1984 these 
facilities still only accounted for 8.5 per cent of lending. 
Currently demand for funds from the rural sector is light and 
the Banks have no trouble providing funds for those that meet the 
qualifying criteria. To a large measure the limited demand from 
potential borrowers is attributed to both the 1984 Budget measures and 
the dramatic increase in interest rates following deregulation and the 
high rates paid in recent Government Stock tenders. 
4.4.7 Offshore Loans 
Offshore loans are becoming an increasingly popular means of 
raising finance for agriculture. Prior to the July 1984 devaluation of 
the New Zealand dollar this method of financing carried with it a 
considerable exchange risk. The high cost of forward cover to offset 
this risk did not deter a growing number of farmers as they did not 
have access to any other form of finance when local funds dried up as a 
result of interest rate controls. 
With devaluation and the removal of interest rate controls the 
exchange rate risk was considerably reduced and the main reason for 
borrowing offshore became the low cost of funds compared to New 
Zealand. The other factors are the longer terms that can be obtained 
(to 15 years in many cases) and ease of access which is still important 
where large sums are involved. 
The extent of offshore borrowing for agriculture is not 
recorded in national statistics and is difficult to obtain from farmer 
surveys as it is not peculiar to anyone institution - Trading Banks, 
Finance companies and Stock and Station Agents can all offer access to 
offshore funds. One finance industry estimate of offshore agricultural 
fund'ing is in excess of $30Om. 
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4.5 Private Non-Institutional Sources. 
4.5.1 Family Loans 
Family loans are the largest source of agricultural credit 
after the Rural Bank (Table 12). Reasons behind the use of family 
funds are probably lower costs, greater security in economic downturns 
and the longer terms that have been available. The latter may not be 
as significant now as family loans are on average being made on shorter 
terms probably because of uncertainty over future rates of inflation. 
4.5.2 Solicitors' Trust Funds 
Solicitors' Trust Funds contributed 7.7 per cent of 
agricultural credit as at June 1984 (Table 12). This source of credit 
grew in importance during the 1970's and early 1980's. As the 
combination of inflation and Government regulation of the institutional 
sources made it increasingly difficult for farmers to obtain credit, 
Solicitors' Trust Funds became a popular source. 
The absence of interest rate controls - at least until 1983 
and the generally low administration charges of solicitors (less than 1 
per cent) made this an attractive channel for investors. The short 
terms of the loans (less than 3 years) were a disadvantage to farmers 
but the alternative was usually no finance at all. 
One considerable advantage to borrowers was that the loans were 
usually made on an interest-only basis. This was particularly helpful 
to those developing horticultural properties and loans through 
Solicitors' Trust Funds have been a common source of finance in new 
horticultural areas such as the Bay of Plenty. The short term of these 
funds and the need for regular renewal became a serious problem in 1983 
after interest rate controls were extended to solicitors' funds and the 
supply dried up. 
4.5.3 Returns to Investors 
It should not be overlooked that a considerable proportion of 
farmers are either direct lenders to agriculture or depositors with 
lending institutions. While high interest rates are to the 
disadvantage of the majority of farmers there are also a proportion who 
stand to benefit. These latter have at times, particularly with high 
inflation, been making losses in real terms on their savings. At 
present inflation and interest rates they have an opportunity to make a 
profit in real terms. This should encourage saving again and will be 
of particular benefit to young farmers saving towards farm purchase. 

SECTION 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This report attempts to review a period during the last two 
years in which dramatic changes in economic and monetary policy have 
occurred. All measures have had an impact on the rural credit 
situation. 
For example at the beginning of the period finance was 
generally cheap but difficult to obtain. At the end of the period 
finance for agriculture is relatively easy to obtain but at high cost. 
What has probably been most damaging to the farming sector has been the 
impact of the change from one extreme to the other. 
Over the past 15 years farmers have corne to rely heavily on 
Government assistance and one of the side effects of this has been an 
acceleration in land values. With the removal of subsidies some 
farmers are facing difficulty in meeting debt commitments on borrowings 
against farmland which was over-valued in relation to the returns from 
it. 
While the devaluation of 18 July 1984 was undoubtedly of help 
to the export sector its beneficial effects were clouded by the 
operation of the SMP scheme. In the case of the sheep industry the New 
Zealand Meat Producers' Board derived much of the benefit through 
reduced pressure being placed on its own price support operation. 
The dismantling of controls on the operations of the financial 
institutions gave them more freedom to operate without Government 
coercion. However as the institutions could not unload quickly the 
lower yielding Government securities they had been forced to purchase, 
a rapid change in lending policy was not expected. But with the 
continuation of much of industry protection as compared to the almost 
immediate abolition of much of the support for agriculture there is a 
danger that the industrial sector will have greater appeal to 
investors. The authors received reports that such a change in 
investment preference has already occurred to the detriment of 
agriculture. 
It was evident that the previously noted trend toward a 
shortening of the term for loans to agriculture has accelerated over 
the last two years. Even the Rural Bank, traditionally a long-term 
lender to agriculture has been affected by the necessity to borrow 
short - this will make long-term lending more difficult. To 
agriculture this trend is unhelpful to an industry where the gestation 
period for much of its investment projects extends over a long period. 
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Trading banks continue to increase their share of agricultural 
lending. However a relative decline in the overdraft system of 
seasonal financing has occurred as farmers have had to resort to more 
term lending. Here again it is considered that such a trend is 
undesirable as the overdraft system is especially appropriate to the 
needs of agriculture. 
It has become apparent that an increasing level of farm costs 
is reducing significantly the benefits of the 1984 devaluation. This 
effect will be accelerated by the effective ending of the SMP scheme 
for the sheep industry at the end of the 1984/85 season. Higher 
interest rates have added to the problems of the industry and for some 
farmers their interest payments as a proportion of gross income are 
reaching a disturbingly high level. 
The authors noted some trends towards an agricultural credit 
system better tailored to the needs of agriculture. For example 
efforts are now being made to introduce a system where borrowers secure 
all their credit needs from a single institution. Notwithstanding this 
innovation it was generally observed that most improvements in lending 
facilities were in the commercial and industrial sectors. 
Until such time as Government reduces its budget deficit before 
borrowing, there is little prospect of reducing upward pressures on 
interest rates in the money market. This means Government must not 
only look to enhancing its revenue but also reducing expenditure. The 
Rural Bank now has to depend increasingly on raising its funds on the 
open market. This freedom which was provided for in its 1974 
legislation was not granted until 1982. Since then the money market 
has been coming under increasing pressure from competing borrowers, in 
particular the Government. It is obvious that the Bank, under present 
conditions, will have great difficulty in securing adequate long-term 
finance. The impact on agriculture could be serious. 
In a monetery environment of high internal interest rates, it 
is not surprising that private offshore borrowing for agriculture has 
developed on an expanding scale. But while savings from lower interest 
rates are considerable these could be more than offset by excha~ge 
losses should the New Zealand dollar continue its past rate of decline. 
Farmers are in general price takers and do not have the natural hedge 
against devaluation which has been assumed for exporters generally. 
Farmers' main concern now is their ability to service debt. 
The cost of finance is the most significant factor causing this 
concern. However interest rates charged to farmers are generally no 
higher than those charged to other sectors of the economy. What sets 
farming apart fronl other sectors is its inability to offset the extra 
cost by raising their prices. 
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